Decision-making is often interpreted in terms of normative computations that maximize 24 a particular reward function for stable, average behaviors. Aberrations from the 25 reward-maximizing solutions, either across subjects or across different sessions for 26 the same subject, are often interpreted as reflecting poor learning or physical 27 limitations. Here we show that such aberrations may instead reflect the involvement 28 of additional satisficing and heuristic principles. For an asymmetric-reward perceptual 29 decision-making task, three monkeys produced adaptive biases in response to 30 changes in reward asymmetries and perceptual sensitivity. Their choices and 31 response times were consistent with a normative accumulate-to-bound process. 32 However, their context-dependent adjustments to this process deviated slightly but 33 systematically from the reward-maximizing solutions. These adjustments were instead 34 consistent with a rational process to find satisficing solutions based on the gradient of 35 each monkey's reward-rate function. These results suggest new dimensions for 36 assessing the rational and idiosyncratic aspects of flexible decision-making. 37 38
Introduction 39
Normative theory has played an important role in our understanding of how the brain forms 40
decisions. For example, many perceptual, memory, and reward-based decisions show 41 inherent trade-offs between speed and accuracy. These trade-offs are parsimoniously 42 captured by a class of sequential-sampling models, such as the drift-diffusion model 43 (DDM) , that are based on the accumulation of noisy evidence over time to a pre-defined 44 threshold value, or bound (Ratcliff, 1978; Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Bogacz et al., 2006 ; 45 Krajbich et al., 2010) . These models have close ties to statistical decision theory, 46 particularly the sequential probability ratio test that can, under certain assumptions, 47 maximize expected accuracy for a given number of samples or minimize the number of 48 samples needed for a given level of accuracy (Barnard, 1946; Wald, 1947; Wald and 49 Wolfowitz, 1948). However, even when these models provide good descriptions of the 50 average behavior of groups of subjects, they may not capture the substantial variability in 51 behavior that can occur across individuals and task conditions. The goal of this study was 52 to better understand the principles that govern this variability, in particular how these 53 principles relate to normative theory. 54 55 We focused on a perceptual decision-making task with asymmetric rewards. For this task, 56
both human and animal subjects tend to make decisions that are biased towards the 57 percept associated with the larger payoff (e.g. Maddox White and Poldrack, 2014) . These biases are roughly consistent with a rational 62 strategy to maximize a particular reward function that depends on both the speed and 63 accuracy of the decision process, such as the reward rate per trial or per unit time (Gold 64 and Bogacz et al, 2006) . This strategy can be accomplished via context-65 dependent adjustments in a DDM-like decision process along two primary dimensions (Fig. 66 1A): 1) the momentary sensory evidence, via the drift rate; and 2) the decision rule, via 67 the relative bound heights that govern how much evidence is needed for each alternative. 68
Subjects tend to make adjustments along one or both of these dimensions to produce 69 overall biases that are consistent with normative theory, but with substantial individual 70 variability ( To better understand the principles that govern these kinds of idiosyncratic behavioral 75 patterns, we trained three monkeys to perform a response-time (RT), asymmetric-reward 76 decision task with mixed perceptual uncertainty ( Fig. 1B) . Like human subjects, the 77 monkeys showed robust decision biases toward the large-reward option. These biases 78
were sensitive to not just the reward asymmetry, as has been shown previously, but also 79 to experience-dependent changes in perceptual sensitivity. These biases were consistent 80 with adjustments to both the momentary evidence and decision rule in the DDM. However, 81 4 these two adjustments favored the large-and small-reward choice, respectively, leading 82 to nearly, but not exactly, maximal reward rates. We accounted for these adjustments in 83 terms of a satisficing, gradient-based learning model that calibrated biases to balance the 84 relative influence of perceptual and reward-based information on the decision process. 85 Together, the results imply the broad applicability of normative theory, including 86 sequential-sampling and heuristic-based strategies to understand how the brain combines 87 uncertain sensory input and internal preferences to form decisions that can vary 88 considerably across individuals and task conditions. 89 90 Results 91
We trained three monkeys to perform the asymmetric-reward random-dot motion 92 discrimination ("dots") task (Fig. 1B) . All three monkeys were initially trained on a 93 symmetric-reward version of the task for which they were required to make fast eye 94 movements (saccades) in the direction congruent with the global motion of a random-dot 95 A, Schematics of the drift-diffusion model (DDM). Motion evidence is modeled as samples from a unit-variance Gaussian distribution (mean: signed coherence, Coh). Effective evidence is modeled as the sum of motion evidence and an internal momentary-evidence bias (me). The decision variable starts at value az, where z governs decision-rule bias, and accumulates effective evidence over time with a proportional scaling factor (k). A decision is made when the decision variable reaches either bound. Reaction time (RT) is assumed to be the sum of the decision time and a saccade-specific non-decision time.
B, Reaction-time (RT) random-dot visual motion direction discrimination task with asymmetric rewards. A monkey makes a saccade decision based on the perceived global motion of a random-dot kinematogram. Reward is delivered on correct trials and with a magnitude that depends on reward context. Two reward contexts (LR-Left and LR-Right) were alternated in blocks of trials with signaled block changes. Motion directions and strengths were randomly interleaved within blocks. kinematogram to receive juice reward. They then performed the asymmetric-reward 96 versions that were the focus of this study. Specifically, in blocks of 30-50 trials, we 97 alternated direction-reward associations between a "LR-Right" reward context (the large  98 reward was paired with a correct rightward saccade and the small reward was paired with 99 a correct leftward saccade) and the opposite "LR-Left" reward context. We also varied the 100 ratio of large versus small reward magnitudes ("reward ratio") across sessions for each 101 monkey. Within a block, we randomly interleaved motion stimuli with different directions 102
and motion strengths (expressed as coherence, the fraction of dots moving in the same 103 direction). We monitored the monkey's choice (which saccade to make) and RT (when to 104 make the saccade) on each trial. 105
The monkeys' biases reflected changes in reward context and perceptual sensitivity 106

Figure 2. Relationships between sensitivity and bias from logistic fits to choice data.
A, For each monkey, the probability of making a rightward choice is plotted as a function of signed coherence (-/+ indicate left/right motion) from all sessions, separately for the two reward contexts, as indicated. Lines are logistic fits. B, Top row: Motion sensitivity (steepness of the logistic function) in each context as a function of session index (colors as in A). Solid lines indicate significant positive partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Black dashed lines indicate each monkey's motion sensitivity in the same task with equal rewards before training on this asymmetric reward task. Middle row: ΔBias (horizontal shift between the two psychometric functions in the two reward contexts at chance level) as a function of session index. Solid line indicates significant negative partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Bottom row: Lapse rate as a function of session index (median=0 for all three monkeys). C, ΔBias as a function of motion sensitivity for each reward context (colors as in A). Solid line indicates a significant negative partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). D, Optimal versus fitted Δbias. Optimal Δbias was computed as the difference in the horizontal shift in the psychometric functions in each reward context that would have resulted in the maximum reward per trial, given each monkey's fitted motion sensitivity and experienced values of reward ratio and coherences from each session (see Fig. S2a ). Solid lines indicate significant negative Spearman correlation (p<0.01). Partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions are also significant for money F and C (p<0.01).
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For the asymmetric-reward task, all three monkeys tended to make more choices towards 107 the large-reward option, particularly when the sensory evidence was weak. These choice 108 biases corresponded to horizontal shifts in the psychometric function describing the 109 probability of making a rightward choice as a function of signed motion coherence 110
(negative for leftward motion, positive for rightward motion; Fig. 2A ). We quantified 111 monkeys' perceptual sensitivity and bias magnitude by fitting a logistic function to 112 monkeys' choice behavior (example fits are shown in Supplementary Fig. 1 ). These 113 measurements differed in detail for the three monkeys. For example, bias magnitude 114 tended to be smallest in monkey F. Moreover, bias magnitude tended to decrease with 115 session number for all three monkeys, although this tendency was statistically significant 116 Figure S2 . A, Identification of the optimal Δbias for an example session using logistic fits. For each reward context (blue for LR-Left and red for LR-Right), RTrial was computed as a function of bias values sampled uniformly over a broad range, given the session-specific sensitivities, lapse rate, coherences and large:small reward ratio. The optimal Δbias was defined as the difference between the bias values with the maximal RTrial for the two reward contexts. The fitted Δbias was defined as the difference between the fitted bias values for the two reward contexts. B, The optimal bias decreases with increasing sensitivity. The example heatmap shows normalized RTrial as a function of sensitivity and bias values in the LR-Right blocks, assuming the same coherence levels as used for the monkeys and a large:small reward ratio of 2.3. The black curve indicates the optimal bias values for a given sensitivity value. C, Scatterplots of optimal Δbiases obtained via the procedure described above as a function of sensitivity for each of the two reward contexts. Same format as Figure  3B . Solid lines indicate significant partial Spearman correlation after accounting for changes in reward ratio across sessions (p<0.05). Note that the scatterplots of the monkeys' Δbiases and sensitivities in only for monkey C after accounting for co-variations with reward rate (Fig. 2B , middle). 117
Additionally, each monkey showed steady increases in perceptual sensitivity (steepness 118 of the psychometric function), which initially dropped relative to values from the symmetric-119 reward task then tended to increase with more experience with asymmetric rewards ( Fig.  120 2B, top; H 0 : partial Spearman's  of sensitivity versus session index after accounting for 121 session-specific reward ratios = 0, p<0.01 in all cases, except LR-Left for monkey C, for 122 which p=0.57). These improvements did not involve systematic changes in lapse rates, 123
which remained near zero across sessions (Fig. 2B, bottom) , implying that the monkeys 124 knew how to perform the task. However, these increases in sensitivity did correspond to 125 systematic decreases in choice biases in some, but not all, cases (3 monkeys x 2 reward 126 contexts; Fig. 2C ), which is expected for an optimal process that maximizes reward per 127 trial (RTrial; Supplementary Fig. 2C ). Compared to these optimal biases, the monkey's 128 biases tended to vary over sessions and overshoot for monkeys F and C ( Fig. 2D ). 129
To better understand the computational principles that governed these idiosyncratic 130 biases, while also taking into account systematic relationships between the choice and RT 131 data, we fit single-trial RT data (i.e., we modeled full RT distributions, not just mean RTs) 132
from individual sessions to a DDM. We used a hierarchical-DDM (HDDM) method that 133 assumes that parameters from individual sessions are samples from a group distribution 134 (Wiecki et al., 2013) . The HDDM had six parameters for each reward context. Four were 135 from a basic DDM ( Fig. 1A) : a, the total bound height, representing the distance between 136 the two choice bounds; k, a scaling factor that converts sensory evidence (motion strength 137
and direction) to the drift rate; and t 0 and t 1 , non-decision times for leftward and rightward 138 choices, respectively. The additional two parameters provided biases that differed in terms 139 of their effects on the full RT distributions ( Supplementary Fig. S3 ): me, which is additional 140
Figure S3. Qualitative comparison between the monkeys' RT distribution and DDM predictions.
A, RT distributions as predicted by a DDM with no bias in decision rule (z) or momentary evidence (me; left), with me>0 (middle), and with z>0.5 (right). RT distributions are shown separately for correct (red) and error (black) trials and using values corresponding to 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles. Positive/negative coh values indicate rightward/leftward saccades. The values of me and z were chosen to induce similar choice biases (~0.075 in coherence units). Note that the me bias induces large asymmetries in RT both between the two choices and between correct and error trials, whereas the z bias induces a large asymmetry in RT for the two choices, but with little asymmetry between correct and error trials. B, The monkeys' mean RTs for four quantiles for the LR-Right (top) and LR-Left (bottom) reward contexts, respectively (same convention as in A). Note the presence of substantial asymmetries between correct and error trials for all three monkeys. momentary evidence that is added to the motion evidence at each accumulating step and 141 has asymmetric effects on the two choices and on correct versus error trials (positive 142 values favor the rightward choice); and z, which determines the decision rules for the two 143 choices and tends to have asymmetric effects on the two choices but not on correct versus 144 error trials (values >0.5 favor the rightward choice). The HDDM fitting results are shown 145 in Fig. 3 , and summaries of best-fitting parameters and goodness-of-fit metrics are 146 provided in Supplementary Table 1 . A DDM variant with collapsing bounds provided 147 qualitatively similar results as the HDDM ( Supplementary Fig. 4 ). Thus, subsequent 148 analyses use the model with fixed bounds, unless otherwise noted. 149
Figure 3. Comparison of choice and RT data to HDDM fits with both momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases.
A, Psychometric data (points as in Fig. 2A ) shown with predictions based on HDDM fits to both choice and RT data. Trials in which monkey chose the left target. Bottom row: Trials in which monkeys chose the right target. Columns correspond to each monkey (as in A), divided into choices in the large-(left column) or small-(right column) reward direction (correct/error choices are as indicated in the leftmost columns; note that no reward was given on error trials). The HDDM-predicted RT distributions were generated with 50 runs of simulations, each run using the number of trials per condition (motion direction  coherence  reward context  session) matched to experimental data and using the best-fitting HDDM parameters for that monkey. 9
150 Supplementary Table 1 . Best-fitting parameters of HDDM.
Figure S4. Fits to a DDM with collapsing bounds.
A, B, A DDM with collapsing bounds and both momentary evidence (me) and decision rule (z) biases fit to each monkey's RT data. Same format as Fig. 3 . C, The model that included both me and z adjustments ("full") had smaller Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values than reduced models ("me" or "z" only) across sessions. Note also the different ranges of ΔAIC for the full-me and full-z comparisons. The mean ΔAICfull-me and ΔAICfull-z values are significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.0007 for Monkey F's full-me comparison and p<0.0001 for all others). D, RT distributions as predicted by the DDM with collapsing bounds, using no bias in z or me (left), me>0 (middle), or z>0.5 (right). Same format as Fig. S3A .
The DDM fits provided a parsimonious account of both the choice and RT data. Consistent 151 with the results from the logistic analyses, the HDDM analyses showed that the monkeys 152 made systematic improvements in psychometric sensitivity (H 0 : partial Spearman's  of 153 sensitivity versus session index after accounting for session-specific reward ratios=0, 154
p<0.01 in all cases except p=0.06 for LR-Left for monkey A). Moreover, there was a 155 negative correlation between psychometric sensitivity and choice bias (H 0 : partial 156
Spearman's  of sensitivity versus total bias after accounting for session-specific reward 157 ratios=0, p<0.001 in all cases). These fits ascribed the choice biases to changes in both 158 the momentary evidence (me) and the decision rule (z) of the decision process, as 159 opposed to either parameter alone ( Supplementary Table 2 ). These fits also indicated 160
context-dependent differences in non-decision times, which were smaller for all large-161 reward choices for all three monkeys except in LR-Right context for monkey C and A (t-162 test, p<0.05). 163
The monkeys' bias adjustments were adaptive with respect to optimal reward-rate 164 functions 165
To try to identify common principles that governed these monkey-and context-dependent 166 decision biases, we analyzed behavior with respect to optimal benchmarks based on 167 certain reward-rate functions. We focused on reward per unit time (RR) and per trial 168 (RTrial), which for this task are optimized in a DDM framework by adjusting momentary-169 evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases, such that both favor the large-reward choice. 170
However, the magnitudes of these optimal adjustments depend on other task parameters 171 (a, k, t 0 , and t 1 , non-bias parameters from the DDM, plus the ratio of the two reward sizes 172 and inter-trial intervals) that can vary from session to session. Thus, to determine the 173 optimal adjustments, we performed DDM simulations with the fitted HDDM parameters 174 from each session, using different combinations of me and z values ( with the leftward choice, the optimal strategy used z<0.5 and me<0 (Fig. 4B , top panels, 177
purple and orange circles for RR and RTrial, respectively). Conversely, when the larger 178 reward was paired with the rightward choice, the optimal strategy used z>0.5 and me>0 179 (Fig. 4B , bottom panels). 180 Supplementary Table 2 . The difference in deviance information criterion (DIC) between the full model (i.e., the model that includes both me and z) and either reduced model (me-only or z-only), for experimental data and data simulated using each reduced model. Negative values favor the full model. Positive values favor the reduced models. Note that the DIC for the experimental data deviated substantially -toward the negative direction -from the DIC for the simulated data.
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The monkeys' adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases 181 showed both differences and similarities with respect to these optimal predictions ( Fig. 4B,  182 black circles; similar results were obtained using fits from a model with collapsing bounds, 183 Supplementary Fig. 5 ). In the next section, we consider the differences, in particular the 184 apparent use of shifts in me in the adaptive direction (i.e., favoring the large-reward choice) 185
but of a magnitude that was larger than predicted, along with shifts in z that tended to be 186 in the non-adaptive direction (i.e., favoring the small-reward choice). Here we focus on the 187 similarities and show that the monkeys' decision biases were adaptive with respect to the 
. Actual versus optimal adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases.
A, Schematic of the comparison procedure. Choice and RT data from the two reward contexts in a given session were fitted separately using the HDDM. These context-and session-specific bestfitting me and z values are plotted as the monkey's data (black circles in B and C). Optimal values were determined by taking the best-fitting values of parameters a, k, and non-decision times from the HDDM fits, then sampling me and z uniformly over broad ranges to predict choice and RT behavior. For each me and z combination, the predicted probability of left/right choice and RTs were used with actual task information (inter-trial interval, error timeout and reward sizes) to calculate the expected reward rate (RR) and average reward per trial (RTrial). Optimal me/z adjustments were then identified to maximize RR (purple) or RTrial (orange). B, Scatterplots of the monkeys' me/z adjustments (black), predicted optimal adjustments for maximal RR (purple), and predicted optimal adjustments for maximal Rtrial (orange), for the two reward contexts in all sessions (each data point was from a single session). Values of me>0 or z>0.5 produce biases favoring rightward choices. C, Scatterplots of the differences in me (abscissa) and z (ordinate) between the two reward contexts for monkeys (black), for maximizing RR (purple), and for maximizing RTrial (orange). Positive Δme and Δz values produce biases favoring largereward choices.
First, the best-fitting me and z values from each monkey corresponded to near-maximal 193 reward rates ( Fig. 5A) . We compared the optimal values of reward per trial (RTrial max ) to 194 the values predicted from the monkeys' best-fitting me and z adjustments (RTrial predict ). 195
Both RTrial predict and RTrial max depended on the same non-bias parameters in the HDDM 196 fits that were determined per session (a, k, t 0 , and t 1 ) and thus are directly comparable. 197
Their ratios tended to be nearly, but slightly less than, one (mean ratio: 0.977, 0.984, and 198 0.982 for monkeys F, C, and A, respectively) and remained relatively constant across 199 sessions (H 0 : slopes of linear regressions of these ratios versus session number=0, 200
p>0.05 for all three monkeys). Similar results were also obtained using the monkeys' 201 realized rewards, which closely matched RTrial predict (Spearman's ρ=0.991, 0.979, and 202 0.906 for monkeys F, C, and A, respectively, p<0.0001 in all three cases). These results 203 reflected the shallow plateau in the RTrial function near its peak ( Fig. 5B ), such that the 204 monkeys' actual adjustments of me and z were within the contours for 97% RTrial max in 205 most sessions ( Fig. 5C ; see Supplementary Fig. 6 for results using RR). Thus, the 206 monkeys' overall choice biases were consistent with strategies that lead to nearly optimal 207 reward outcomes. 208 209
Figure S5. Estimates of momentaryevidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases using the collapsing-bound DDM fits.
Same format as Fig. 4B and C, except here only showing fits to the monkeys' data. As with the model without collapsing bounds, the adjustments in me tended to favor the large reward but the adjustments in z tended to favor the small reward.
Figure 5. Predicted versus optimal reward per trial (RTrial).
A, Scatterplots of RTrial predict :RTrial max ratio as a function of session index. Each session was represented by two ratios, one for each reward context. Mean ratio across contexts and sessions: 0.977 for monkey F, 0.984 for monkey C, and 0.983 for monkey A. B, 97% RTrial max contours for all sessions, computed using the best-fitting HDDM parameters and experienced coherences and reward ratios from each session. Light grey: LR-Left blocks; Dark grey: LR-Right blocks. C, The monkeys' adjustments (blue in LR-Left blocks, red in LR-Right blocks) were largely within the 97% RTrial max contours for all sessions and tended to cluster in the me over-biased, z under-biased quadrants (except Monkey F in the LR-Right blocks). The contours and monkeys' adjustments are centered at the optimal adjustments for each session.
Second, the across-session variability of each monkey's decision biases was predicted by 212 idiosyncratic features of the reward functions. The reward functions were, on average, 213 different for the two reward contexts and each of the three monkeys ( Fig. 6A ). These 214 differences included the size of the near-maximal plateau (red patch), which determined 215 the level of tolerance in RTrial for deviations from optimal adjustments in me and z. This 216 tolerance corresponded to the session-by-session variability in each monkey's me and z 217 adjustments ( Fig. 6B ). In general, monkey F had the smallest plateaus and tended to use 218 the narrowest range of me and z adjustments across sessions. In contrast, monkey A had 219 the largest plateaus and tended to use the widest range of me and z adjustments 220 (Pearson's  between the size of the 97% RTrial contour, in pixels, and the sum of the 221 across-session variances in each monkeys' me and z adjustments=0.83, p=0.041). 222
Analyses using the RR function produced qualitatively similar results ( Supplementary Fig.  223 7). 224 225 Figure S6 . Predicted versus optimal reward rate (RR). Same format as Fig. 5 . Mean RR predict :RR max ratio across sessions=0.970 for monkey F, 0.980 for monkey C, and 0.979 for monkey A.
Figure 6. Relationships between adjustments of momentary-evidence (me) and decision-rule (z) biases and RTrial function properties.
A, Mean RTrial as a function of me and z adjustments for the LR-Left (top) and LR-Right (bottom) blocks. RTrial was normalized to RTrialmax for each session and then averaged across sessions. B, Scatterplot of the total variance in me and z adjustments across sessions (ordinate) and the area of >97% max of the average RTrial patch (abscissa). Variance and patch areas were measured separately for the two reward blocks (circles for LR-Left blocks, squares for LR-Right blocks). C, D, The monkeys' sessionand contextspecific values of me (C) and z (D) co-varied with the orientation of the >97% heatmap patch (same as the contours in Fig. 5B ). Orientation is measured as the angle of the tilt from vertical. Circles: data from LR-Left block; squares: data from LR-Right block; lines: significant correlation between me (or z) and patch orientations across monkeys (p<0.05). Colors indicate different monkeys (see legend in B). E, Scatterplots of conditionally optimal versus fitted me (top row) and z (bottom row). For each reward context, the conditionally optimal me (z) value was identified given the monkey's best-fitting z (me) values. The conditionally optimal me (z) was the difference between the two conditional optimal me (z) values for the two reward contexts. Grey lines indicate the range of conditional me (z) values corresponding to the 97% maximal RTrial given the monkeys' fitted z (me) values. including the orientation of the plateau with respect to z and me, depended on the 230 monkey's perceptual sensitivity and the reward ratio for the given session. The monkeys' 231 me and z adjustments varied systematically with this orientation (Fig. 6C and D for RTrial, 232 Supplementary Fig. 7C and D for RR). This result was not an artifact of the fitting 233 procedure, which was able to recover appropriate, simulated bias parameter values 234 regardless of the values of non-bias parameters that determine the shape of the reward 235 function ( Supplementary Fig. 8 ). 236
Fourth, the monkeys' me and z adjustments were correlated with the values that would 237 maximize RTrial, given the value of the other parameter for the given session and reward 238 context ( Fig. 6E for RTrial, Supplementary Fig. 7E for RR). These correlations were 239 substantially weakened by shuffling the session-by-session reward functions 240 Red lines indicate the partial Spearman correlation coefficients between the fitted and optimal me or z (obtained in the same way as data in Fig. 6E ) for matched sessions. Bars represent the histograms of partial correlation for unmatched sessions, which were obtained by 100 random shuffles of the sessions). Note that the correlation values for unmatched sessions were lower than those for matched sessions (Wilcoxson rank-sum test, p<0.001 for all three monkeys and both me and z).
( Supplementary Fig. 9 ). Together, these results suggest that all three monkeys used 241 biases that were adaptively calibrated with respect to the reward information and 242 perceptual sensitivity of each session. 243
244
The monkeys' adaptive adjustments were consistent with a satisficing, gradient-245 based learning process 246
Thus far, we showed that all three monkeys adjusted their decision strategies in a manner 247 that matched many features of the optimal predictions based on their idiosyncratic, 248
context-specific reward-rate functions. However, their biases did not match the optimal 249 predictions exactly. Specifically, all three monkeys used shifts in me favoring the large-250 reward choice (adaptive direction) but of a magnitude that was larger than predicted, along 251 with shifts in z favoring the small-reward choice (non-adaptive direction). We next consider 252
if and how a consistent, adaptive process used by all three monkeys could lead to these 253 idiosyncratic and not-quite optimal patterns of adjustments. 254
We propose that a gradient-based satisficing model can account for these patterns of 255
adjustments. The intuition for the model is shown in Fig. 7 . The lines on the RTrial heatmap 256
represent the trajectories of a gradient-tracking procedure that adjusts me and z values to 257 increase RTrial until reaching 97% of the maximum possible value. Gradient lines are 258 color-coded based on how me and z values at the end points relate to the optimal me and 259 z values. For example, consider adjusting me and z by following all of the magenta 260 gradient lines until their endpoints. This procedure would result in me shifts in the adaptive 261 direction with magnitudes larger than the optimal me, plus z shifts in the non-adaptive 262 direction. In other words, as long as the initial me and z values fall within the area covered 263 by the magenta lines, the positive gradient-tracking procedure would lead to a good-264 enough solution with over-shifted me and non-adaptive z values similar to what we found 265 in the monkeys' data. 266
267
We simulated this process with the reward function derived for each reward context, 268 session, and monkey, using different starting points and a termination rule corresponding 269
to achieving the estimated RTrial predict from those conditions (see above). This process is 270 illustrated for LR-Left blocks in an example session from monkey C (Fig. 8A) . We 271 estimated the unbiased me and z values as the midpoints between their values for LR-272
Left and LR-Right blocks (square). At this point, the RTrial gradient is larger along the me 273 dimension than the z dimension, reflecting the tilt of the reward function. We set the initial 274 point at baseline z and a very negative value of me (-90% of the highest coherence used 275 in the session; overshoot in the adaptive direction) and referred to this setting as the "over-276
me" model. The me and z values were then updated in a step-wise fashion (magenta 277 trace), according to the RTrial gradient, until the monkey's RTrial predict or better was 278
Figure 7. Relationships between starting and ending values of the satisficing, reward function gradient-based updating process.
Example gradient lines of the average RTrial maps for the three monkeys are color coded based on the end point of gradient-based me and z adjustments in the following ways: 1) me biases to large reward whereas z biases to small reward (magenta); 2) z biases to large reward whereas me biases to small reward (blue); 3) me and z both bias to large reward (green), and 4) me and z both bias to small reward (yellow). The gradient lines ended on the 97% RTrialmax contours. Top row: LR-Left block; bottom row: LR-Right block. achieved (magenta circle). The endpoint of this updating process was very close to 280 monkey C's actual adjustment (gray circle). For comparison, three alternative models are 281 illustrated. The "over-z" model selects z as the initial dimension and assumes updating 282 from the baseline me and over-adjusted z values (blue, initial z set as 0.1 for the LR-Left 283 context and 0.9 for the LR-Right context). The "over-both" model assumes updating from 284 the over-adjusted me and z values (green). The "neutral" model assumes the same 285 updating process but from the baseline me and baseline z (black). The endpoints from 286 these alternative models deviated considerably from the monkey's actual adjustment. 287
The "over-me" model produced better predictions than the other three alternative models 288 for all three monkeys. Of the four models, only the "over-me" model captured the monkeys' 289 tendency to bias me toward the large-reward choice (positive me) and bias z toward the 290 small-reward choice (negative z; Fig. 8B ). In contrast, the "over-z" model predicted small 291 adjustments in me and large adjustments in z favoring the large-reward choice; the "over-292
both" model predicted relatively large, symmetric me and z adjustments favoring the large-293 reward choice; and the "neutral" model predicted relatively small, symmetric adjustments 294 in both me and z favoring the large-reward choice. Accordingly, for each monkey, the 295 predicted and actual values of both me and z were most strongly positively correlated 296
for predictions from the "over-me" model compared to the other models (Fig. 8C ). The 297
"over-me" model was also the only one of the models we tested that recapitulated the 298 measured relationships between both me-and z-dependent biases and session-by-299 session changes in the orientation of the RTrial function ( Fig. 8D ). Qualitatively similar 300 results were obtained with a different criterion that stopped updating when RTrial reached 301 a fixed 98% of RTrial max , suggesting that the ability of the "over-me" model to mimic 302 monkeys' performance did not simply result from setting session-specific final RTrial 303 values. Similar results were observed using RR function ( Supplementary Figs. 10 and 11) . 
Discussion 310
We analyzed the behavior of three monkeys performing a decision task that encouraged 311 the use of both uncertain visual motion evidence and the reward context. All three 312 monkeys made choices that were sensitive to the strength of the sensory evidence and 313
were biased toward the larger-reward choice, which is roughly consistent with previous 314 studies of humans and monkeys performing similar tasks (Maddox and Bohil, 1998 .However, we also found that these 319 adjustments differed considerably in detail for the three monkeys, in terms of overall 320 magnitude, dependence on perceptual sensitivity and offered rewards, and relationship to 321
RTs. We quantified these effects with a logistic analysis and a commonly used model of 322 decision-making, the drift-diffusion model (DDM), which allowed us to compare the 323 underlying decision-related computations to hypothetical benchmarks that would 324 maximize reward. We found that all three monkeys made reward context-dependent 325 adjustments with two basic components: 1) an over-adjustment of the momentary 326 evidence provided by the sensory stimulus (me) in favor of the large-reward option; and 327
2) an adjustment to the decision rule that governs the total evidence needed for each 328 choice (z), but in the opposite direction (i.e., towards the small-reward option). These 329 adjustments tended to provide nearly, but not exactly, maximal reward intake. We 330 proposed a common heuristic strategy based on the monkeys' individual reward functions 331
to account for the idiosyncratic adjustments across monkeys and across sessions within 332 the same monkey. 333
Considerations for assessing optimality and rationality 334
Assessing decision optimality requires a model of the underlying computations. In this 335 study, we chose the DDM for several reasons. the sequential probability ratio test that can optimally balance the speed and accuracy of 344 uncertain decisions (Barnard, 1946; Wald, 1947; Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948) . These 345 normative links were central to our ability to use the DDM to relate the monkeys' 346 behavior to different forms of reward optimization. 347
Assessing optimality also requires an appropriate definition of the optimization goal. In our 348 25 study, we mainly focused on the goal of maximizing reward rate (per trial or per unit of 349 time). Based on this definition, the monkeys showed suboptimal reward-context-350 dependent adjustments. It is possible that the monkeys' were optimizing for a different 351 goal, such as accuracy or a competition between reward and accuracy ("COBRA," 352 Maddox and Bohil, 1998 ). However, the monkeys' behavior was not consistent with 353 optimizing for these goals, either. Specifically, none of these goals would predict optimal 354 z adjustment that favors the small reward choice: accuracy maximization would require 355 unbiased decisions (me=0 and z=0.5), whereas COBRA would require z values with 356 smaller magnitude (between 0.5 and those predicted for reward maximization alone), but 357 still in the adaptive direction. Therefore, the monkeys' strategies were not consistent with 358 simply maximizing commonly considered reward functions. 359
Deviations from optimal behavior are often ascribed to a lack of effort or poor learning. 360
However, these explanations seem unlikely to be primary sources of suboptimality in our 361 study. For example, lapse rates, representing the overall ability to attend to and perform 362 the task, were consistently near zero for all three monkeys. Moreover, the monkeys' 363 reward outcomes (RTrial or RR with respect to optimal values) did not change 364 systematically with experience but instead stayed close to the optimal values. These 365 results imply that the monkeys understood the task demands and performed consistently 366 well over the course of our study. More importantly, the monkeys made adjustments that 367
were adapted to changes in their idiosyncratic, context-dependent reward functions, which 368 reflected session-specific reward ratios and motion coherences and the monkeys' daily 369 variations of perceptual sensitivity and speed-accuracy trade-offs ( Fig. 6, Supplementary  370  Fig. 7 ). Based on these observations, we reasoned that the seemingly sub-optimal 371 behaviors may instead reflect a common, adaptive, rational strategy that aimed to attain 372 good-enough (satisficing) outcomes. 373
The gradient-based, satisficing model we proposed was based on the considerations 374 discussed below to account for our results. We do not yet know how well this model 375 generalizes to other tasks and conditions, but it exemplifies an additional set of general 376 principles for assessing the rationality of decision-making behavior: goals that are not 377 necessarily optimal but good enough potential heuristic strategies based on the properties 378 of the utility function, and flexible adaptation to changes in the external and internal 379 conditions. 380
Assumptions and experimental predictions of the proposed learning strategy 381
In general, finding rational solutions through trial-and-error or stepwise updates requires 382 a sufficient gradient in the utility function to drive learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998 contrast, our proposed strategy focuses on reward-biased behaviors for a given speed-393 accuracy tradeoff and operates on reward per trial, which is, by definition, independent of 394 inter-trial-interval. Our scheme was based on three key assumptions, as follows. 395
Our first key assumption was that the starting point for gradient following was not the 396 unbiased state (i.e., me=0 and z=0.5) but an over-biased state. Notably, in many cases 397 the monkeys could have performed as well or better than they did, in terms of optimizing 398 reward rate, by making unbiased decisions. The fact that none did so prompted our 399 assumption that their session-by-session adjustments tended to reduce, not inflate, biases. 400
Specifically, we assumed that the initial experience of the asymmetric reward prompted 401 Figure S12 . Dependence of the orientation and area of the near-optimal RTrial patch on parameters reflecting internal decision process and external task specifications.
The top two rows show the RTrial heatmaps with two values of a single parameter indicated above, while keeping the other parameters fixed at the baseline values. The third and fourth rows show the estimated orientation (the amount of tilt from vertical, in degrees) and area (in pixels), respectively, of the image patches corresponding to 97% of RTrial max . The baseline values of the parameters are: a=1.5, k=6, non-decision times=0.3 sec for both choices, ITI=4 sec, Timeout=8 sec, large-reward (LR): small-reward (SR) ratio=2.
an over-reaction to bias choices towards the large-reward alternative. In general, such an 402 initial over-reaction is not uncommon, as other studies have shown excessive, initial 403 biases that are reduced or eliminated with training (Gold et al., 2008; Jones, et al., 2015; 404 Nikolaev et al., 2016) . The over-reaction is also rational because the penalty is larger for 405 an under-reaction than for an over-reaction. For example, in the average RTrial heatmaps 406 for our task (Fig. 6A) , the gradient dropped faster in the under-biased side than in the over-407 biased side. This pattern is generally true for tasks with sigmoid-like psychometric 408 functions (for example, the curves in Supplementary Fig. 2 ). Our model further suggests 409 that the nature of this initial reaction, which may be driven by individually tuned features 410 of the reward function that can remain largely consistent even for equal-reward tasks 411
( Supplementary Fig. 12 ) and then constrain the end-points of a gradient-based adjustment 412 process (Fig. 8) 2015) ). 415
The specific form of initial over-reaction in our model, which was based on the gradient 416 asymmetry of the reward function, makes testable predictions. Specifically, our data were 417 most consistent with an initial bias in momentary evidence (me), which caused the biggest 418 change in the reward function. However, this gradient asymmetry can change dramatically 419 under different conditions. For example, changes in the subject's cautiousness (i.e., the 420 total bound height parameter, a) and perceptual sensitivity (k) would result in a steeper 421 gradient in the other dimension (the decision rule, or z) of the reward function 422
( Supplementary Fig. 13 ). Our model predicts that such a subject would be more prone to 423 D, The ratio of the mean gradients along the me and z dimensions as a function of the product of a and k. Our model assumes that the initial bias is along the dimension with the steeper gradient according to each monkey's idiosyncratic RTrial function. Note that because me and z have different units, the boundary between initial-me and initial-z conditions may not correspond to a gradient ratio of 1.
an initial bias along that dimension. This prediction can be tested by using speed-accuracy 424 instructions to affect the bound height and different stimulus parameters to change 425 perceptual sensitivity (Palmer et al 2005; Gegenfurtner and Hawken, 1996) . 426
Our second key assumption was that from this initial, over-biased state, the monkeys 427 made adjustments to both the momentary evidence (me) and decision rule (z) that 428 generally followed the gradient of the reward function. The proposed step-wise 429 adjustments occurred too quickly to be evident in behavior; e.g., the estimated biases 430
were similar for the early and late halves in a block (data not shown). Instead, our primary 431 support for this scheme was that the steady-state biases measured in each session were 432 tightly coupled to the shape of the reward function for that session. It would be interesting 433
to design tasks that might allow for more direct measurements of the updating process 434
itself, for example, by manipulating both the initial biases and relevant reward gradient 435 that might promote a longer adjustment process. 436
Our third key assumption was that the shallowness of the utility of the function around the 437 peak supported satisficing solutions. Specifically, gradient-based adjustments, particularly 438 those that use rapid updates based on implicit knowledge of the utility function, may be 439 sensitive only to relatively large gradients. For our task, the gradients were much smaller 440 around the peak, implying that there were large ranges of parameter values that provided 441 such similar outcomes that further adjustments were not used. In principle, it is possible 442
to change the task conditions to test if and how subjects might optimize with respect to 443 steeper functions around the peak. For example, for RTrial, the most effective way to 444 increase the gradient magnitude near the peak (i.e., reducing the area of the dark red 445 patch) is to increase sensory sensitivity (k) or cautiousness (a; i.e., emphasizing accuracy 446 over speed; Supplementary Fig. 12 ). For RR, the gradient can also be enhanced by 447
increasing the time-out penalty. Despite some practical concerns about these 448 manipulations (e.g., increasing time-out penalties can decrease motivation), it would be 449
interesting to study their effects on performance in more detail to understand the 450 conditions under which satisficing or "good enough" strategies are used (Simon, 1956; 451 Simon, 1982) . 452
The satisficing reward gradient-based scheme we propose may further inform 453 appropriate task designs for future studies. For example, our scheme implies that the 454 shape of the reward function near the peak, particularly the steepness of the gradient, 455
can have a strong impact on how closely a subject comes to the optimal solution for a 456
given set of conditions. Thus, task manipulations that affect the shape of the reward-457 function peak could, in principle, be used to control whether a study focuses on more-or 458 less-optimal behaviors ( Supplementary Fig. 14) . For example, increasing perceptual 459 sensitivity (e.g., via training) and/or decisions that emphasize accuracy over speed (e.g., 460
via instructions) tends to sharpen the peak of the reward function. According to our 461 scheme, this sharpening should promote increasingly optimal decision-making, above 462
and beyond the performance gains associated with increasing accuracy, because the 463 gradient can be followed closer to the peak of the reward function. The shape of the 464 peak is also affected by the reward ratio, such that higher ratios lead to larger plateaus, 465 29 i.e. shallower gradient, near the peak. This relationship leads to the idea that, all else 466 being equal, a smaller reward ratio may be more suitable for investigating principles of 467 near-optimal behavior, whereas a larger reward ratio may be more suitable for 468
investigating the source and principles of sub-optimal behaviors. 469
Possible neural mechanisms 470
Figure S14. Effects of the shape of the reward function on deviations from optimality. A, Illustration of our heuristic updating model and measurement of deviation of the end point from optimal. Yellow dot: optimal solution. Gray lines: trajectory for gradient ascent, ending at 0.97 maximal RTrial. Black line: trajectory for updating from the starting point (black dot, me=0.54, z=0.5), which ended at 0.97 maximal RTrial (blue dot). The deviation of the end point from optimal is measured as the distance from the yellow dot to the blue dot (yellow dashed line). The same starting point and ending criterion were used for data shown in B and C. B, The area of the 0.97 maximal RTrial plateau and endpoint deviation from optimal increase with reward ratio. The product of a and k is fixed as 30. C, The area of the 0.97 maximal RTrial plateau and endpoint deviation from optimal decrease with the product of a and k. Reward ratio is fixed as 3.
30
The DDM framework has been used effectively to identify and interpret neural substrates 471
of key computational components of the decision process for symmetric-reward versions 472 of the motion-discrimination task. Our study benefitted from an RT task design that 473 provided a richer set of constraints for inferring characteristics of the underlying decision 474 process than choice data alone (Feng et preference, whereas a neuron that encodes z may show reward modulation opposite to 494 its choice preference ( Supplementary Fig. 15 ). These predictions further suggest that, 495
although it is important to understand if and how human or animal subjects can perform 496 a certain task optimally, for certain systems-level questions, there may be benefits to 497 tailoring task designs to promote sub-optimal strategies in otherwise well-trained 498 subjects. 499 500 Figure S15. Hypothetical neural activity encoding a reward-biased perceptual decision variable. The blue and red curves depict rise-to-threshold dynamics in favor of a particular (say, rightward) choice under the two reward contexts, as indicated. Note that when the rightward choice is paired with larger reward: 1) the slope of the ramping process, which corresponds to an adjustment in momentary evidence (me), is steeper; and 2) the baseline activity, which corresponds to the decision-rule (z) adjustment, is lower.
Methods 502
Subjects 503
We used three rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), two male and one female, to study 504 behavior on an asymmetric-reward reaction-time random-dot motion discrimination task 505 (Fig. 1B, see below) . Prior to this study, monkeys F and C had been trained extensively 506 on the equal-reward RT version of the task (Ding and Gold Health Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the 511
University of Pennsylvania Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. 512
Behavioral task 513
Our task ( Fig. 1B) was based on the widely used random-dot motion discrimination task 514 that typically has symmetric rewards (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Ding and Gold, 515 2010). Briefly, a trial started with presentation of a fixation point at the center of a 516 computer screen in front of a monkey. Two choice targets appeared 0.5 s after the 517 monkey acquired fixation. After a delay, the fixation point was dimmed and a random-dot 518 kinematogram (speed: 6 /s) was shown in a 5 aperture centered on the fixation point. 519
For monkeys F and C, the delay duration was drawn from a truncated exponential 520 distribution with mean=0.7 s, max=2.5 s, min=0.4 s. For monkey A, the delay was set as 521 0.75 s. The monkey was required to report the perceived global motion direction by 522 making a saccade to the corresponding choice target at a self-determined time (a 50-ms 523 minimum latency was imposed to discourage fast guesses). The stimulus was 524 immediately turned off when the monkeys' gaze left the fixation window (4, 4, and 3 525 square windows for monkey F, C, and A, respectively). Correct choices (i.e., saccades to 526 the target congruent with actual motion direction) were rewarded with juice. Error 527 choices were not rewarded and instead penalized with a timeout before the next trial 528 began (timeout duration: 3 s, 0.5-2 s, and 2.5 s, for monkeys F, C, and A, respectively). 529
On each trial, the motion direction was randomly selected toward one of the choice 530 targets along the horizontal axis. The motion strength of the kinematogram was 531 controlled as the fraction of dots moving coherently to one direction (coherence). On 532 each trial, coherence was randomly selected from 0.032, 0.064, 0.128, 0.256, and 0.512 533 for monkeys F and C, and from 0.128, 0.256, 0.512, and 0.75 for monkey A. In a subset 534 of sessions, coherence levels of 0.064, 0.09, 0.35, and/or 0.6 were also used for monkey 535
A. 536
We imposed two types of reward context on the basic task. For the "LR-Left" reward 537 context, correct leftward saccades were rewarded with a larger amount of juice than 538 correct rightward saccades. For the "LR-Right" reward context, correct leftward 539 32 saccades were rewarded with a smaller amount of juice than correct rightward 540 saccades. The large:small reward ratio was on average 1.34, 1.91, and 2.45 for 541 monkeys F, C, and A, respectively. Reward context was alternated between blocks and 542 constant within a block. Block changes were signaled to the monkey with an inter-block 543
interval of 5 s. The reward context for the current block was signaled to the monkey in 544 two ways: 1) in the first trial after a block change, the two choice targets were presented 545 in blue and green colors, for small and large rewards, respectively (this trial was not 546 included for analysis); and 2) only the highest coherence level (near 100% accuracy) 547
was used for the first two trials after a block change to ensure that the monkey physically 548 experienced the difference in reward outcome for the two choices. For the rest of the 549 block, choice targets were presented in the same color and motion directions and 550 coherence levels were randomly interleaved. 551
Basic characterization of behavioral performance 552
Eye position was monitored using a video-based system (ASL) sampled at 240 Hz. RT 553 was measured as the time from stimulus onset to saccade onset, the latter identified 554 offline with respect to velocity (> 40/s) and acceleration (> 8000/s 2 ). Performance was 555 quantified with psychometric and chronometric functions (Figs. 2 and 3) , which describe 556 the relationship of motion strength (signed coherence, Coh, which was the proportion of 557 the dots moving in the same direction, positive for rightward motion, negative for leftward 558 motion) with choice and RT, respectively. Psychometric functions were fitted to a logistic 559 function (Equation (1) 
Reward-biased drift-diffusion model 566
To infer the computational strategies employed by the monkeys, we adopted the widely 567 used accumulation-to-bound framework, the drift-diffusion model (DDM; Fig. 1A ). In the 568 standard DDM, motion evidence is modeled as a random variable following a Gaussian 569 distribution with a mean linearly proportional to the signed coherence and a fixed 570 variance. The decision variable (DV) is modeled as temporal accumulation (integral) of 571 the evidence, drifting between two decision bounds. Once the DV crosses a bound, 572 evidence accumulation is terminated, the identity of the decision is determined by which 573 bound is crossed, and the decision time is determined by the accumulation time. RT is 574 modeled as the sum of decision time and saccade-specific non-decision times, the latter 575 accounting for the contributions of evidence-independent sensory and motor processes. 576
To model the observed influences of motion stimulus and reward context on monkeys' 577 choice and RT behavior, we introduced two reward context-dependent terms: z specifies 578 33 the relative bound heights for the two choices and me specifies the equivalent 579 momentary evidence that is added to the motion evidence at each accumulating step. 580
Thus, for each reward context, six parameters were used to specify the decision 581 performance: a: total bound height; k: proportional scaling factor converting evidence to 582 the drift rate; t 0 and t 1 : non-decision times for leftward and rightward choices, 583 respectively; and z and me. Similar approaches have been used in studies of human 584 and animal decision making under unequal payoff structure and/or prior probabilities 585 (Voss et To fit the monkeys' data, we implemented hierarchical DDM fitting using an open-source 588 package in Python, which performs Bayesian estimates of DDM parameters based on 589 single-trial RTs (Wiecki et al., 2013) . This method assumes that parameters from 590 individual sessions are samples from a group distribution. The initial prior distribution of 591 a given parameter is determined from previous reports of human perceptual 592 performance and is generally consistent with monkey performance on equal reward 593 motion discrimination tasks (Ding and Gold, 2010; Matzke and Wagenmakers, 2009 ). 594
The posterior distributions of the session-and group-level parameters are estimated with 595
Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling. 596
For each dataset, we performed 5 chains of sampling with a minimum of 10000 total 597 samples (range: 10000-20000; burn-in: 5000 samples) and inspected the trace, 598 autocorrelation and marginal posterior histogram of the group-level parameters to detect 599 signs of poor convergence. To ensure similar level of convergence across models, we 600 computed the Gelman-Rubin statistic (R-hat) and only accepted fits with R-hat<1.01. 601
